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On Cognitive Neuroscience 
Stephen M. Kosslyn 
Stephen M.  Kosslyn  is  Professor of  Psychology at  Harvard 
University and an Associate Psychologist in the Department of 
Neurology at the Massachusetts General Hospital. He received 
his B.A. in 1970 from UCLA and his Ph.D. from Stanford Uni- 
versity in  1974, both in psychology, and taught at Johns Hopkins, 
Harvard, and Brandeis Universities before joining the Harvard 
Faculty as Professor of  Psychology in  1983. His work focuses 
on the nature of  visual mental imagery and high-level vision, 
as  well  as applications  of  psychological principles to  visual 
display design. He has  published  over  125 papers on these 
topics, co-edited five books, and authored or co-authored five 
JOCN:  You  played a major role in establishing the phe- 
nomenon of  mental imagery as a tractable scientific prob- 
lem. You  started  your  work  in  the  area  of  cognitive 
psychology but now have moved squarely into cognitive 
neuroscience. Why? 
SK The short answer is  that facts about the brain  al- 
lowed me to answer questions that seemed unanswera- 
ble using purely behavioral measures. 
JOCN:  And the long answer? 
SK:  My predecessors  developed  methods to  study the 
functions of  imagery, such as  its role  in  memory and 
reasoning. I was interested in a different set of  questions, 
concerned with the structure of  the representations that 
underlie the experience of  visual mental imagery. I con- 
sider these representations as types of  data structures in 
an information processing system. In my original exper- 
iments, starting with one on image scanning in  1973, I 
used  response  time  to  try  to  infer  properties of  such 
representations. For example, I used response time as a 
kind of  “mental tape measure” in the scanning experi- 
ments, with the goal of  showing that mental image rep- 
resentations  embody  spatial  extent.  Introspectively, 
images seem to have pictorial properties, which seemed 
to  make  sense  if  the representation  itself  is  a kind of 
spatial pattern. This type of  representation would depict, 
rather than describe, the visual properties  of  an object 
or scene. If so, I  reasoned, then people should require 
more time to shift attention farther distances across ob- 
jects in their mental images (even when their eyes were 
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closed). And this is just what happened: The farther peo- 
ple had to scan across an object to locate a named prop- 
erty, the longer it took. 
The same year  that  the original  scanning paper  ap- 
peared, Pylyshyn published his critique of  mental imag- 
ery.  He  argued  that  mental  images  are  stored  as 
“propositional” representations,  no  different  in  kind 
from the representations that underlie language. In his 
view, the pictorial properties of  imagery that are evident 
to introspection are entirely epiphenomenal; they play 
no part in information processing. These properties are 
like the heat from a light bulb when one reads, which 
plays no role in the reading process. Thus began the so- 
called “imagery debate,” which has kept me focused on 
imagery all these years. 
The  imagery debate was not about whether  people 
experience mental  images; all parties agreed that they 
do. It  was  about the nature of  the underlying  internal 
representations. Do the same types of  representations 
underlie  the experience  of  visual  mental  images  and 
language, or is  there something  special  about at  least 
some of  the representations  used in imagery? I  naively 
thought that the results from my  scanning experiments 
spoke to this issue; they did, after all, show that a property 
of  imagery that  is  evident to  introspection-spatial  ex- 
tent-affects  information processing. But this finding was 
easily explained in other ways. Some researchers argued 
that the visual properties of  objects are represented  as 
lists, and more time was required to iterate further down 
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but  do not  depict  information-they  are not  images. 
Some others argued that the instructions for the task led 
the subjects to  use these types of  representations  (un- 
consciously) to  mimic what they would do in the cor- 
responding perceptual situation. At its heart, the problem 
was that the theories were too underconstrained. When 
faced with additional data, people could alter their no- 
tions about the properties of  processes in order to pre- 
serve properties of  their favorite representation. I found 
this state of  affairs very frustrating. Presumably, there is 
a fact  to  the  matter: When  one has the experience of 
imagery, at  least one of  the underlying representations 
either has or does not have depictive properties. 
So, why cognitive neuroscience? Neuroscientific infor- 
mation  provided  a way  to ground this research, to  re- 
move some of  the degrees of  freedom that made it so 
easy to explain the behavioral  results. When I did “dry 
mind”  research,  ignoring  the  brain,  I  argued  that  an 
image  representation  is  like a pattern  of  points  in  an 
array in a computer. When I  learned that multiple top- 
ographically mapped areas  in  the macaque cortex are 
used  in  visual perception, this  made  theorizing  much 
more concrete and direct, and also provided  grounds 
for making strong predictions: If one could show that at 
least  some of  these topographically  mapped areas are 
active when one closes one’s eyes and forms visual men- 
tal  images, this would go  a large part of  the way toward 
demonstrating that image representations are depictive. 
And  if  imagery were disrupted  when  these  areas  are 
damaged, one could not argue that the representations 
they  support  are  purely  epiphenomenal.  Moreover, 
Pylyshyn had raised a number of  potential paradoxes; for 
example, does the  “mind’s eye” need  a “mind’s eye’s 
brain”?  And does the mind’s eye’s brain require its own 
mind’s eye to “see”  the images? Considering the roles of 
other areas that are connected to these topographically 
organized areas provided a handle on these issues. Turn- 
ing to the brain not only helped me to  characterize the 
questions, but invited additional approaches toward an- 
swering them-and  these methods produced  data that 
were more difficult to explain in other ways. 
JOCN:  Well, before we go into what your journey into 
brain science has taught you, would you care to define 
what you think the goals of  cognitive neuroscience ought 
to be or might be? Your first thoughts simply reference 
some well known traditional neuroscience work. Is cog- 
nitive neuroscience a new intellectual discipline or sim- 
ply  traditional  neuropsychology  dressed  up  in  a  new 
phrase? 
SK Cognitive neuroscience is a good illustration of  how 
the whole can be more than the sum of  its parts. In my 
view, cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary meld- 
ing of studies of  the brain, of  behavior and cognition, 
and of computational systems that have properties of  the 
brain  and that  can produce behavior  and cognition. I 
don’t think of  cognitive neuroscience as the intersection 
of  these areas, as the points  of  overlap, but  rather  as 
their union: It is  not just that each approach constrains 
the others, but rather that each approach provides  in- 
sights into different aspects of  the same phenomena. 
When you ask about “traditional neuropsychology,” I 
assume that you don’t mean the early work by clinicians 
that was designed to detect brain  injury; this work was 
extremely empirical, and not aimed at understanding the 
underlying mechanisms. The more interesting compari- 
son, I think, is to “cognitive neuropsychology.” Both cog- 
nitive  neuropsychology  and  cognitive  neuroscience 
make use of  theory developed in cognitive psychology 
and cognitive science to  characterize the nature of  the 
behavior or cognitive process to  be studied. And  both 
enterprises want to specify how information processing 
occurs; indeed, both sets of  researchers often  rely  on 
computational models. Moreover, both  enterprises  ex- 
ploit tasks and methodologies that have been developed 
in cognitive psychology and cognitive science (and these 
tasks  and  methods  are often  more  sophisticated  than 
those used  in  traditional  neuropsychology). The major 
contrast between  cognitive neuroscience and cognitive 
neuropsychology  is  revealed by  the different nouns  in 
their  names.  Cognitive neuroscience  is  an  attempt  to 
understand how cognition arises from brain processes; 
the  focus is  on the brain, as  the term “neuroscience” 
implies. We don’t want to separate the theory  of infor- 
mation  processing  from  the theory  of  the  brain  as  a 
physical mechanism. Cognitive neuropsychology, at least 
as characterized by  Caramazza, Shallice, and others, fo- 
cuses on the functional  level per se. They want  to un- 
derstand  information  processing  independently  of 
properties of  the wetware itself. 
A complete cognitive neuroscience theory would spec- 
ify more than just the component processes and princi- 
ples  of their  interaction. In  addition, it  would  specify 
how each process is  instantiated in the brain, and how 
brain circuits produce the input/output mappings acconi- 
plished by  each process. This understanding would ex- 
tend  down  to  individual  types  of  receptors, channels, 
and ultimately to the genes. Given these goals, it seems 
clear that cognitive  neuroscience must  move  closer to 
neurobiology. But it will not simply become neurobiol- 
ogy:  Cognitive  neuroscience  adds  methods  and  tech- 
niques to study, and conceptualize, how the brain gives 
rise to cognition and behavior. 
JOCN:  For some, the componential nature of  the new 
cognitive psychology translated  nicely  into  the  neuro- 
logic clinic where bizarre dissociations are the rule. Per- 
haps, it was felt, processing modules could be selectively 
hit with brain lesions and therein provide support for a 
cognitive formulation. Yet would you not agree the 06- 
jectzve of  a mature cognitive neuroscience would be to 
ascertain the algorithms active in translating structural/ 
physiological data into psychological function. 
SK.  Yes, that‘s part of  the objective. We  want to under- 
stand  not  just  the  component processes,  but  also  the 
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tion,+the  algorithms, if you will. 
JOCN:  Isn’t this what  David  Marr  had  in  mind? What 
would you say is Marr’s greatest contribution, looked at 
with the cold lenses of  hindsight some dozen years after 
his death? 
SK: I  think cognitive neuroscience  owes an enormous 
amount to David Marr. Marr provided the first concrete, 
well-worked-out example of  how one could rigorously 
combine  neuroscientific,  computational,  and  psycho- 
physical findings and concepts. He provided an illustra- 
tion  of how  the  different  sorts of  information  could 
illuminate a single problem, providing insights into dif- 
ferent aspects of  it. Even though the details of  his partic- 
ular  theory of  visual processing may not stand the test 
of  time, his style of  thinking and approach are nothing 
short of brilliant. In my view, one of  Marr’s best ideas is 
his conception of  a “theory of  the computation,” which 
has received surprisingly little attention. He was unhappy 
with  the tendency  in Artificial Intelligence  research to 
make up theories purely on the basis of  intuition, and 
wanted theories to be rooted in careful logical analyses 
and empirical investigation. Marr argued that one should 
develop a theory of  the computation whenever one pro- 
poses a particular decomposition  into processing  com- 
ponents. Such a theory  rests  on a detailed analysis of 
what  information processing  problems must  be solved 
in  order for a system to  be capable of  having certain 
abilities; the abilities are determined empirically, from 
studies of  normal cognition and behavior and studies of 
cognition and behavior  following brain  damage. Once 
one has a theory of  the goal of  a processing component 
or set  of components, what they’re for, one then is in a 
position to  theorize  about the specific representations 
and algorithms that are used.  I  can’t possibly do justice 
to  these  ideas  here,  so  let  me  simply  recommend 
strongly that  people go back  and  read Marr’s book,  if 
only to understand his style of  thinking. Too much of  his 
good advice has been neglected by contemporary “con- 
nectionist” modelers, who often seem to make up the- 
ories at the level of  the algorithm as they go along. 
JOCN:  Does Marr’s approach guide you? 
SK 1  try to develop “poor man’s versions” of  theories 
of  what is computed. I simply don’t have Marr’s gift for 
seeing how to  formalize vaguely specified problems. In 
my  new book, Image and Brain, I’ve tried to use Marr’s 
approach in a qualitative way, and even this seems pref- 
erable  to  relying  solely  on  intuition  and  attempts  to 
explain empirical results. 
JOCN:  OK, let’s take the problem of  mental imagery and 
go through how the brain side of  the story has evolved 
over the last  10 years. First, what  has the lesion work 
instructed us about imaginal processes? 
SK: Two main messages emerge from the lesion work: 
First, imagery and like-modality perception share many 
common mechanisms, even though they do not rely on 
identical mechanisms. One often sees corresponding def- 
icits in imagery and perception (such as unilateral visual 
neglect, as documented by  Bisiach and his colleagues), 
but also can find patients who have intact imagery and 
deficient perception (e.g., as documented by  Behrmann 
and her colleagues) and vice versa (e.g.,  as demonstrated 
by  Charcot, Brain, and others many years ago). The find- 
ing that imagery shares many mechanisms with percep- 
tion  is  very  important  because  it  is  much  easier  to 
understand perception than to understand imagery: Not 
only is perception rooted in observable stimulus events 
(which  can  be experimentally manipulated  and corre- 
lated with psychological events), but also we have very 
good  animal  models  of  our  perceptual  systems  and 
hence have come to  understand  the underlying neural 
systems in  considerable detail. We  can  “piggyback” on 
this understanding when developing theories of  imagery. 
Second, results  from lesion studies have shown that 
imagery is not a single process. For example, the “what 
vs. where” distinction that Ungerleider and Mishkin in- 
troduced  in  visual perception also extends to  imagery 
(e.g., as demonstrated  by Levine, Calvanio, and .Farah). 
Moreover, different  imagery abilities can be selectively 
disrupted by brain damage. For example, my colleagues 
and  I  have  described  patients  who can  generate  and 
maintain images (at least of  the types we tested) but have 
difficulty rotating objects in images. 
JOCN: Are  you  really  comfortable with  these  conclu- 
sions? Isn’t the  lesion  method  full of  difficulties? For 
example, couldn’t the dissociation you  mention simply 
be reflecting task difficulty? Surely it is more difficult to 
rotate an image and given that, the brain damage itself 
rears its ugly head? 
SK:  The  lesion  method,  like  all  others,  has  potential 
problems and has to be used with care. For example, as 
you note, more difficult tasks will not be performed as 
well by  patients with brain damage-and  so a dissocia- 
tion may say nothing about the existence of  distinct pro- 
cessing components. But  this is  not an insurmountable 
problem. One way to deal with it  is to design tasks that 
are equated for difficulty. The most straightforward way 
to do,  this is to pretest age- and education-matched con- 
trol subjects, and adjust the materials until these subjects 
require the same mean time and have the same mean 
error rates in the tasks. Another response to this sort of 
possible problem is to obtain a “double  dissociation,” to 
find two  patients with the opposite pattern of  deficits. 
However, even when one does find a clean double dis- 
sociation, such a result  is not  airtight evidence for the 
existence of  separate processing components; Shallice’s 
book  has  a nice  discussion  of  the applicability of  the 
logic of  double dissociation, and in 1992 Intriligator and 
I published a paper (in this journal) that touched on this 
topic. 
JOCN:  Aren’t there better approaches? For example, can 
a  cognitively  impoverished  disconnected  right  hemi- 
sphere carry out mental  rotation  tasks or can only the 
cognitively superior left hemisphere? 
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and their strengths. Hemispheric dissociations are a valu- 
able source of  converging data, but they too are some- 
times ambiguous. For  example, there are reports  that 
patients with  unilateral  left- and unilateral  right-hemi- 
sphere lesions have deficits in mental rotation, and there 
are divided-visual-field studies of  normal subjects that 
report that the right hemisphere is better than the left 
hemisphere, that the left hemisphere is superior, or that 
both hemispheres are equally effective. I don’t find this 
surprising: Any  complex task  is likely to  be performed 
by many component processes working in concert, some 
of  which may be more effective in one hemisphere and 
some of  which may be more effective in the other hemi- 
sphere-and  depending on the precise nature of  the task, 
different components may contribute more or less to the 
overall processing, leading to hemispheric differences in 
performance. 
JOCN:  So, what are the strengths of  the lesion approach? 
SK:  I find lesion data particularly useful for testing pre- 
dictions:  If one posits  that  the posterior  parietal  lobe 
does function X, patients with damage to  this area had 
better  show deficits in  tasks  that rely on this function. 
Similarly, if one claims that a particular region is the seat 
of  a  specific  processing  component, then  damage to 
other regions should not affect that function (when fac- 
tors such  as overall activation level and diaschesis are 
controlled). Lesion work can play a critical role in telling 
one whether a specific area is necessary and/or sufficient 
for a specific type of  processing. 
In  addition, selective deficits following brain damage 
have enormous heuristic value; even though these defi- 
cits do  not always reflect the loss of  individual processing 
components in isolation, they sometimes may. And thus 
they can serve as a useful source of  hypotheses, they can 
inform one’s theory of  what is computed. Harking back 
to  Marr, his theory of  how shapes are stored in long- 
term  memory  was  influenced  by  Warrington’s finding 
that  some types  of  brain-damaged  patients  could  not 
identify objects seen from unusual points of  view. There 
is no guarantee that the hypothesis is correct, of  course 
(and I think Marr was off  the mark in this case), hut that’s 
not the point: The dissociations following brain damage 
can lead one to formulate interesting hypotheses, which 
in turn lead to further empirical investigation. 
In  general, lesion  data, like all other sorts, are best 
used  as one source of  converging evidence. There are 
lots ofpotential problems with any method. This doesn’t 
mean that these potential problems are actual problems 
in any specific case. 
JOCN:  Converging evidence  is  important, to  be  sure. 
However, neuroscience often seems to depend on dou- 
ble dissociation as the solid test of  theories about cog- 
nitive function. Perhaps convergent evidence is called for 
only when a double dissociation cannot be found. For 
example, it  would  be hard  to  find  a  patient  that  can 
rotate an image they can’t generate! 
SK Actually,  I would  predict  that there should be pa- 
tients who can rotate objects in images but have difficulty 
generating them; in the typical rotation task, the stimulus 
remains in view, and the task does not require activating 
information stored in long-term memory (in Cooper and 
Shepard’s famous tasks, the subjects usually are simply 
asked whether  a visible figure is  facing normally or is 
mirror reversed, regardless of  its  angular orientation ). 
In any case, double dissociations are only one of  a num- 
ber of  sources of  evidence that can converge to support 
a particular theory of  cognitive processing. 
JOCN: Well, this notion of  converging data is a version 
of  the meta-analysis approach, is it not? Who was it that 
said if you see a pile of  shit, you know there must he a 
pony in there somewhere? Psychological processes are 
full  of  probabilistic  events  that  allow  meta-analysis to 
work. When it  comes to biological processes, however, 
the  approach  seems  inappropriate.  Either  you  know 
something or you  don’t. Either something  is  built  in  a 
certain way or it is not. 
SK: I don’t think of  converging evidence as a version of 
the meta-analysis approach. That approach is most com- 
monly used to  find statistical significance over a set of 
individual studies, each of  which  may  have  reported 
nonsignificant findings. In the approach I advocate, each 
individual finding should be statistically  significant.  That’s 
not at issue. What’s at issue is how to interpret the indi- 
vidual results. And it is  here that convergent evidence is 
so important, given that results from any given method 
usually are open to alternative interpretations. To say that 
“you know  something  or you  don’t’’ is  correct  if  we 
define “something”  as a specific result; one knows that a 
patient with  lesion X, or with  information  sent only to 
hemisphere Y, does this-and-that well but  not this-and- 
the-other-thing. The results themselves do not imply that 
one knows that a specific process exists or that a partic- 
ular sequence of  information processing takes place; it’s 
up to the theorist to interpret the data. 
In  my view the convergent evidence approach  does 
two things for you. First, it helps you figure out whether 
a given finding is due to some kind of  artifact or meth- 
odological problem. There are plenty of  such possible 
snags with any method, but these are  potential problems 
and  need  not  necessarily bedevil  a given  experiment. 
The best way  to know whether to take a specific set of 
results seriously, in my view, is to see whether  it  lines 
up with  results  from  other  methods (which also have 
potential problems, but different ones). 
Second, the converging evidence approach does more 
than simply validate the different methods. It fleshes out 
the nature of  the phenomena to be studied, and provides 
insights into different aspects of  the underlying mecha- 
nisms. A good convergent evidence approach  uses the 
results from one type of  study to guide other types of 
studies. For example, results from our recent fMRI stud- 
ies suggest that only some subjects activate primary visual 
cortex during imagery, although the other subjects do 
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leads to an hypothesis about processing: Do subjects who 
activate primary visual cortex  have  more vivid  images 
than  those who do not  activate this region? If so, they 
should be able to  answer questions that require  high- 
resolution images better than subjects who don’t activate 
primary visual cortex, but there should be no difference 
if  low-resolution imagery is all that is necessary. Similarly, 
this  line of  thinking  leads to  asking whether  primary 
visual  cortex  is  necessary  for  high-resolution  images, 
which could be tested by  examining patients who have 
selective damage to  primary visual cortex, but  little or 
no damage to circumstriate regions; will they form fuz- 
zier  images than  patients  with  equivalent  damage  to 
other parts of  the brain? And so forth. 
So, different methods are used to ask about different 
facets of  a problem.  I  think  it  is important to  keep in 
mind  that  depending on what particular  question you 
ask, different things count as answers. And  depending 
on the kind of  answer you seek, different methods will 
be  more  or less  appropriate.  If  you  want  to  know 
whether a specific area is involved in processing, a brain- 
scanning study makes sense. If you want to know whether 
this area is necessary for such processing, a lesion study 
makes sense, and so forth. 
JOCN: But  the  convergent  evidence approach  breaks 
down if the results don’t line up, doesn’t it? You mention 
brain-scanning results. What we have with PET results is, 
at this point, a set of  findings. It now appears impossible 
to  activate, using  PET,  the frontal  eye fields.  If  PET  is 
tracking activity, how could that be? It now appears the 
hippocampus is not activated during memory tasks. How 
could that be?  A recent review of  language studies finds 
each investigator has activated different cortical areas for 
phonological and semantic processing. How could that 
be? 
SK  The convergent  evidence approach  doesn’t  imply 
that the results necessarily must converge . . . only that 
they will make sense if you do  the right experiments and 
your theory guides you to  look for the right character- 
istics of  the data. If  you don’t design a task properly to 
engender a specific type of  activation, you won’t see the 
brain  footprints of  that  type  of  processing. And  these 
footprints need not be consistent activation of  a single 
locus. They could be activation of  a pattern of areas, of 
any k  of  ~2  possible areas, and so forth; my own view is 
that individual areas can be characterized  as having spe- 
cific functions that will reliably be reflected by  PET  ac- 
tivation, but that’s not the only possibility. With PET  the 
situation is particularly tricky because  most  PET  work 
involves subtracting blood  flow in one condition from 
blood flow in another. Depending on the nature of  the 
baseline task, different patterns of  activation will be evi- 
dent. 
JOCN:  If there are constraints in  understanding lesion 
data and hemisphere data, I suppose there are constraints 
in interpreting PET  data. You  have recently jumped into 
the PET  arena and have published  a fascinating report 
that visual imagery involves primary visual cortex. Give 
a quick synopsis of that study and tell us what you think 
the data can mean. 
SK The PET  research on imagery that we’ve conducted, 
in conjunction with Nat Alpert and the MGH group, has 
centered on resolving the “imagery debate.” As I  men- 
tioned at  the outset, this debate focused on the nature 
of  the internal representations underlying the experience 
of  imagery. Specifically, when one experiences a visual 
mental image, is a picture-like “depictive” representation 
being processed? My colleagues and I argued that-mi- 
raculously!-introspection  can  sometimes reveal  prop- 
erties of  the functional  representations.  To  investigate 
this issue, we showed that topographically mapped visual 
cortex is activated when one forms visual mental images, 
even if one’s eyes are closed. In addition, we found that 
spatial properties of  images systematically affect the ac- 
tivation in  these areas: When subjects visualized letters 
so that they seemed to subtend large visual angles, the 
centroid of  activation shifted toward the anterior portions 
of  this topographically mapped area, relative to when the 
subjects visualized letters so that they seemed to subtend 
small visual angles. In fact, the coordinates of  these cen- 
troids were reasonably close to where they should be, 
based on the estlmated “size”  of  the imaged letters (using 
techniques  I  developed  in  the  1970s to  estimate  the 
“visual angle” subtended by  imaged objects). I am now 
fairly confident that the activated area in medial occipital 
cortex probably is area 17, especially given results from 
later work with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI, e.g., from  Ogawa and Tank, from Le  Bihan and 
Turner, and from a collaboration we have with Belliveau 
at the MGH); this technique allows more precise locali- 
zation within a single individual. 
What  do such findings  mean? It  is  well  known  that 
most areas  in  the visual system (of  the macaque) that 
have  afferent  connections  to  other areas  also  receive 
efferent connections from them; the connections are re- 
ciprocal.  I  argue that visual  information  is  stored in  a 
type of  compressed code, and that imagery occurs when 
visual memories cause activation to flow backward in the 
visual system, along the efferent connections, to recon- 
struct a pattern in topographically organized cortex. By 
so doing, the shape, color, and spatial properties of  ob- 
jects are made accessible for additional processing. For 
example, your  visual  memory of  a German Shepherd 
dog is probably stored in inferior temporal cortex using 
some kind of  population code, which specifies shape by 
a vector defined over a large set of  neurons with complex 
response properties. If  I ask you whether the dog’s ears 
are pointed, or whether the ears sit on the top or sides 
of  its head, or whether they protrude above the top of 
its head, you will probably generate a visual mental im- 
age to reconstruct the actual spatial layout. Once you’ve 
generated the image, you can “take a second look’ and 
reinterpret  information  that was  only implicit  in your stored memories.  As  this view  implies, we did  in  fact 
find activation in inferior temporal cortex and a variety 
of  other areas that  presumably are used  in generating 
and interpreting visual images. 
JOCN:  So, are you bothered by  the fact  that there are 
findings suggesting  mental  imagery  goes on  in  other 
cortical areas such as the frontal lobes? 
SK:  Not  at  all; this is exactly as we predicted. We have 
argued that imagery involves depictive representations, 
which occur in  topographically  mapped regions of  the 
occipital lobe, but  imagery  also  involves nondepictive 
long-term memory representations (which we think are 
stored in  the inferior  temporal  lobe) and  lots of  pro- 
cessing (including in frontal areas) to generate and use 
images.  As Marr argued, the brain apparently implements 
many, very  specialized  “computations,” which  may  be 
carried  out in  different  regions. Any  complex  activity, 
such as imagery, perception, or memory, is likely to be 
accomplished by a host of  relatively simple computations 
that work in concert. Our PET  results show that a system 
of  areas  is  involved  in  carrying  out  imagery. So, for 
imagery, we find that area in the frontal lobes that are 
used to  direct attention to key aspects of  visual stimuli 
are also activated when one generates images. We  hy- 
pothesize that high-resolution images are generated by 
activating visual  memories of  individual parts or prop- 
erties, and  “placing” them  in  the appropriate  relative 
locations. This  process,  we  argue, relies  on the same 
machinery used to shift attention to search for a distinc- 
tive part of  an object during perception. Other imagery 
activities, such as mental rotation or image maintenance, 
would use other combinations of  simple component pro- 
cesses. So, from this perspective we expect different tasks 
to result in different patterns of  brain activation. 
JOCN:  Given the large number of  assumptions, is  this 
technology really useful for cognitive neuroscience? 
SK All methods rely on lots of  assumptions, so that fact 
alone can’t be a criticism of  PET  or MRI  per se. It’s still 
too soon to know what the critical assumptions are for 
these techniques; I suspect that the best way to find out 
is to keep using the techniques and vary various param- 
eters, discovering what  is  and is  not  important. Is  the 
technology useful? Depending on the question one asks, 
different things count as answers. If one wants to know 
whether  two  tasks  rely  on the  same  processing, then 
showing that the same pattern of  brain activation occurs 
during both can help one to answer that question. If one 
wants to  know whether two  processes are the same or 
different, then finding separate patterns of  activation for 
them  can  answer  the question.  In  my  view, the  new 
scanning technologies are likely to play an even greater 
role in cognitive neuroscience as we begin to character- 
ize what  distinct  areas  of  the  brain  do (e.g., anterior 
cingulate cortex, area 46, etc.); once we have character- 
ized what an area does, we then can start to draw infer- 
ences about how subjects perform a task that activates 
that  area. Given that the area is activated, one has evi- 
dence that a specific process is used to perform the task. 
This sort of  reasoning is not always going to be simple 
or straightforward, however, because  a number of  dif- 
ferent processes may  turn out to be  supported by  the 
same tissue, or the function of  a given area may turn out 
to depend in part on what other areas are doing, but the 
more we  understand  about what  an  area of  the brain 
does, the more we can learn about a task that activates 
that  area.  But  again, let  me stress, I  think  convergent 
evidence  is  the way  to  go; there is  no Royal  Road  to 
understanding how the brain gives rise to the mind. 
JOCN:  PET,  then, will play a greater role in sharpening 
ideas about cognitive models of  imagery or memory or 
whatever. I guess you don’t see it playing a role in actually 
instructing the neuroscience side of  the equation, namely 
the physiological mechanism  active in  enabling a cog- 
nitive state. After all, when activation is detected, it is not 
at all clear whether it reflects inhibition or excitation at 
the synaptic level. 
SK I’m no expert on the physiology of  PET, but I think 
it’s too soon to foreclose any specific use of  it. PET  may 
well turn out to be a tool that can be used to  determine 
whether a particular activation reflects net inhibition or 
excitation. I would argue that the problem of  character- 
izing neural  activity will be  solved only by  developing 
and testing specific theories. In cognitive neuroscience, 
we are trying to develop theories of  what sets of  neurons 
do. In my view, as we understand how specific compo- 
nents of  the functional architecture are implemented in 
the brain, we will necessarily come to understand more 
about the neural substrate. Our ignorance  of whether 
activation reflects net excitation versus inhibition pales 
besides our ignorance of  what are the consequences of 
a local pattern of  activation for processing in the system 
as a whole. The ambiguous nature of  activation is actually 
much worse than you note: It’s not simply that we don’t 
know whether the activity reflects net inhibition or ex- 
citation at the synaptic level, it’s that we don’t know what 
the  area  is  doing  (is  it  activating stored information? 
releasing  some other area  from  inhibition? selectively 
activating a process implemented elsewhere? transform- 
ing input into a different kind of  output? etc.) and we 
don’t know how the area is carrying out this computation. 
PET  is  one method  that  will  help  us  to  answer  such 
questions, and  in  so doing we will  understand  more 
about the brain  itself. PET  will not be the only tool  to 
advance our knowledge of  neural activity, and probably 
couldn’t do  it alone, but it will be one  source of  conver- 
gent evidence. 
JOCN:  But for the cognitive modeler,  the details of  what 
is happening at a synaptic level are not important. Right? 
SK To the contrary, in my  view the two  enterprises- 
understanding  cognitive processing  and understanding 
the neural substrate-mutually  inform each other; they 
are different facets of  the same problem. It is clear that 
further insights about neurophysiology and  neuroanat- 
omy inform the cognitive end (for example, Rockland’s 
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area V1  have clear implications for theories of  imagery), 
and as we come to  understand  the nature of  cognitive 
processing, that  should  inform  theories  of  the  neural 
substrate  (e.g., my  view  of  what  V1  does  has  been 
changed by  our PET  results).  A  more detailed under- 
standing of  the neural  activity that  underlies  a specific 
pattern of activation will aid cognitive modeling. Indeed, 
someone wanting to  build  a “realistic” neural network 
model will very much want to know patterns of  excitatory 
and inhibitory interactions at the synaptic level; and even 
questions about the nature and organization of  process- 
ing subsystems will be easier to answer as we know more 
details about  the  neural  events  that  produce  specific 
activation and the specific anatomic connections among 
local portions of  the brain. 
JOCN:  So, what’s the next step? You’ve been working 
on visual mental imagery for over 20 years now; what 
do you see for the next 20 years? 
SK: We’ve begun to  make a dent in understanding the 
mechanisms that allow us to  produce and use mental 
images, but  it is clear that this is only a dent. My work 
has become increasingly focused on understanding  the 
role of  specific content in directing and modulating pro- 
cessing. For example, a major question that has received 
too little attention concerns the role of  imagery in emo- 
tion. Why  do vivid images often accompany highly emo- 
tional memories? What roles do these images play? How 
does the imagery system that we’ve begun to characterize 
interact with the neural systems that underlie emotion? 
My current goal is to use PET and fMRI to try to under- 
stand (at a relatively coarse level) the circuitry that causes 
one’s palms to sweat when one visualizes a threatening 
scene (e.g., teetering on a narrow trail etched into the 
side of  a very steep mountain). As part of  this effort, I 
would like to understand the role of  imagery in classical 
conditioning. Thirty years ago this would have seemed a 
very odd juxtaposition indeed, but it is now possible to 
study  such  questions-and  perhaps  even  to  begin  to 
answer them! 
JOCN: Thank you. 
Reprint  requests should be sent to  Stephen M. Kosslyn, De- 
partment of  Psychology, 832 William James Hall, Harvard Uni- 
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